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The European Patent Office Enlarged Board of Appeal was
asked in April 2019 to answer two questions regarding the
exclusions from patentability under Art. 53 European Pa-
tent Convention (EPC), the dominant patent law in Europe.
The first related to the manner in which EPC Articles
should be interpreted, and the second to whether Art. 53
EPC excluded plants and animals that are the products of
the excluded “essentially biological processes.” Since pro-
duct claims are infringed by all processes for making the
product, the second question was important—if the pro-
ducts are patentable, the exclusion of the processes is
rendered meaningless, something which cannot have been
the intention of the legislators drafting the EPC. The
questions are in case G‐3/19 Peppers and the Enlarged
Board of Appeal handed down its opinion on May 14, 2020.
In this paper we examine the background to this case, the
strength of the arguments presented, and the Enlarged
Board's decision which we find to dangerously undermine
the Article of the EPC, Art. 164 EPC, which requires
changes to the principles of what can be patentable to be
democratically agreed by the parliaments of the EPC
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member states rather than by an administrative body of
government‐appointees.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
An international convention, the European Patent Convention (EPC),1 discussed and negotiated over more than 20
years, was signed in 1973 and later ratified by the parliaments of its member states. The EPC caused an institution,
the European Patent Office (EPO) to be set up which could grant European Patents which could be brought into
force in the member states with the same effects as patents granted by their national patent offices. The EPO Is
headed by a President and run by the European Patent Organisation, itself governed by an Administrative Council
on which each member state has a government‐appointed representative. The principles on which the EPO may
grant patents are set out in the Articles of the EPC, while more practical matters concerning the operation of the
EPO are set out in the legally subordinate Implementing Regulations or Rules of the EPC. In principle, the legally
dominating Articles have to be approved democratically by the parliaments of the member states, while the Rules
are set by the Administrative Council without requiring any parliamentary approval. Thus, in general, changing the
Articles requires approval by a diplomatic conference of the member states and subsequent ratification by the
individual parliaments. To ensure that the principles agreed by the parliaments are not overridden by adminis-
trators, Art. 164 EPC specifies that if the Rules and the Articles conflict then the Articles prevail.
The decisions of the operating departments of the EPO which can refuse or reject patent applications or grant,
maintain or revoke patents, the Receiving Section and the Examining and Opposition Divisions, are appealable to
the EPO's Boards of Appeal, these being part of a further, quasi‐independent, department of the EPO. Board of
Appeal decisions are not appealable further, but there exists an Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBoA), the members of
which are mostly drawn from the Boards of Appeal, which points of law can be referred to. The Boards, including
the EBoA, are required to follow the EPC but are not bound by the national laws or court decisions of the member
states or the laws or court decisions of the European Union (EU). Indeed, while all EU member states are also EPC
member states, there are EPC member states that are not in the EU.
With the rise in commercial importance in the 1980s of biotechnology in general, and genetic modification of
life forms in particular, the administrative arm of the EU, the European Commission, sought to persuade the
European Parliament and the European Council to adopt a Directive requiring the EU member states to ensure that
their national laws permitted the patenting of many of the new techniques and their products, in particular
genetically modified plants and animals. After prolonged discussion, this Directive (Directive 98/44/EC, the Biotech
Directive) was issued in July 1998. This Directive was of particular relevance to Art. 53(b) EPC which, then and
now, forbids the grant of European Patents for “plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the
preparation of plants or animals.” Having initially hoped that the EPC was compliant with the Directive, in
September 1999 the EPO's Administrative Council introduced new EPC Rules which sought to ensure that
compliance. The timing was critical since a case was then pending before the EBoA on the patentability of
genetically modified plants and animals. The EPO was under pressure to ensure compliance, and while this could
have been done by way of a diplomatic conference to amend the Articles of the EPC, this would have taken time
and might not have received the required approval of the parliaments of all the EPC member states.
The exclusion of Art. 53(b) EPC might on first sight seem to be clear—all new forms of plants and animals could
not be patented (old forms being inherently unpatentable due to the law's requirement for an invention to be new
before it can be patented) and that new biological (rather than technical) ways of producing plants or animals,
680 | COCKBAIN AND STERCKX
whether old types or new types, could not be patented. New technical processes could be patented, and patents for
processes extend their cover to the products obtained directly by the claimed process, but not to the progeny of
such products. This interpretation, however, is at odds with the terms of the Directive and, in December 1999, a
few months after the introduction of the new Rules, the EBoA decided in G‐1/98 Transgenic plants/NOVARTIS II
that new types of plant or animal could be patented as long as the claims were worded at a “higher taxonomic
level,” for example, as claims to rodents rather than to house mice. Such claims, however, encompass and are
infringed by real plants or animals, and the first part of the exclusion seemed to have been emasculated.
Companies then sought to patent plants produced by “conventional” biological processes such as crossing and
selection, initially arguing that the processes were not excluded as long as they contained a technical step, and
subsequently by adopting the higher taxonomic level approach to claiming the plants themselves. This reached the
EBoA in cases G‐2/12 Tomatoes II/STATE OF ISRAEL and G‐2/13 Broccoli II/PLANT BIOSCIENCE and, after a
lengthy interpretation of the process exclusion of Art. 53(b) EPC, it concluded in March 2015 that it could see no
basis for rejecting the higher taxonomic level claims to conventionally bred plants, even though the patentees had
disclosed no other way of producing such plants than by the excluded essentially biological processes. Since claims
to products are infringed by all processes used to produce the products, the product claims would cover the use of
conventional plant production techniques, and would cover the progeny of the originally used process. The
emasculation of Art. 53(b) EPC seemed complete.
Then the European Parliament passed a resolution (EP, 2015) later in 2015 calling on the European Com-
mission to confirm that the Biotech Directive was intended to exclude the products of essentially biological pro-
cesses from patentability and the Commission duly issued a notice (EC, 2016) to this effect. Once more under
pressure to show that the patent law in Europe was harmonized, in June 2017 the EPO's Administrative Council
agreed to introduce a new rule, Rule 28(2) EPC, confirming that Art. 53(b) EPC did not allow the patenting of such
products. A case on the matter was heard by one Board of Appeal which decided in December 2018 (in T‐1063/18
Extreme dark green, blocky peppers/SYNGENTA) that the new Rule, conflicting with the EBoA's decision in G‐2/12,
did not apply. Again under pressure, the President referred the matter back to the EBoA in April 2019 and on May
14 2020 the EBoA handed down its opinion in G‐3/19 Peppers.
In G‐3/19, the EBOA fully endorsed its reasoning in the five previous cases it had heard relating to Art. 53(b)
EPC, that is, G‐1/98, G‐2/07, G‐1/08, G‐2/12, and G‐2/13, but nonetheless decided that circumstances had changed
since the G‐2/12 decision in March 2015 and that a “dynamic interpretation” of Art. 53(b) EPC now required it to
abandon the interpretation of G‐2/12 and decide that “the exception to patentability of essentially biological
processes for the production of plants or animals in Article 53(b) EPC has a negative effect on the allowability of
product claims and product‐by‐process claims directed to plants, plant material or animals, if the claimed product is
exclusively obtained by means of an essentially biological process or if the claimed process features define an
essentially biological process.”
Here, we should note, the product exclusion that the EBoA is creating flows from the process exclusion in Art.
53(b) EPC and not from the product exclusion to be found there. This is important since the EBoA is in effect saying
that the higher taxonomic level manner of claiming plants and animals that it approved in G‐1/98 stays unchanged.
So, what precisely were the changes in circumstances that allowed this “dynamic” reinterpretation. Very simple—
the introduction of Rule 28(2) EPC. Nothing more, nothing less.
This brings us to the most unsettling aspect of the EBoA's opinion. If exhaustive attempts in 2015 to interpret Art.
53(b) EPC (which has not been changed since its adoption in 1973), showed that the “correct” meaning was that the
EPC legislators had not intended to exclude the products of essentially biological processes, then is the Rule not in
conflict with the Article? If it is, then the Rule is inoperative. If it is not, then either the EBoA was wrong in its 2015
interpretation, something it strenuously denies in G‐3/19, or the EPO's Administrative Council have got away with
something Art. 164 EPC was intended to prevent, the alteration of the scope of the Articles, something that is reserved
to a diplomatic conference requiring later, democratic, ratification by the parliaments of the member states. If this is the
case, then there is nothing to stop the Administrative Council from doing the same with the other pesky exclusions from
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patentability that the drafters of EPC 1973 so inconveniently chose to include. Here, we would draw attention to the
discussions leading up to the adoption of the EPC where the UK government's suggestions in October 1971 that
exclusions be left out of the Articles (to allow later flexibility) were firmly rebutted (see IGC, 1971, p. 51).
To put the EBoA's new opinion into context, we will now discuss some of the background before making a
suggestion as to what the truly correct decision might have been.
2 | EXCLUSIONS FROM PATENTABILITY IN THE EPC
Whether or not patents, that is, temporary monopolies, can be granted for living things is fraught with social,
ethical, and political problems. In the drafting of a uniform patent law for Europe, the framers of the EPC decided
that certain things should not be patentable, and the EPC contains two sets of exclusions from patentability: Art.
52(2) EPC which excludes certain things as not being inventions (for European Patents can only be granted for
inventions); and Art. 53 EPC which, for socioethical reasons, excludes other things, which could be inventions. In
this paper, we are concerned only with Art. 53(b) EPC:
European patents shall not be granted in respect of … (b) plant or animal varieties or essentially biological
processes for the production of plants or animals; this provision shall not apply to microbiological processes
or the products thereof
The wording of Art. 53(b) EPC raises two problems—what is meant by the exclusions—and in what manner
must the wording of a patent claim be interpreted to determine whether the resulting European Patent would be in
respect of excluded subject matter?
A lot of ink has been spilt on determining the scope of the exclusions of Art. 53 EPC, and the Boards of Appeal
and the EBoA have handed down many decisions in this regard. This has caused a further severe problem to come
to the fore: since their decisions cannot be appealed, what can be done if the Boards of Appeal decide on a meaning
of the terms of the EPC that is incorrect?
The most final and effective manner of “correcting” a decision is for the contracting states to arrange a
diplomatic conference to amend the EPC's Articles. However, this takes many years and there is always the risk
that one or more parliaments may reject the reinterpretation desired by the other states.
An alternative is for an applicant or opponent to persuade a Board of Appeal in a further case to decide on a
different interpretation of the Article or to refer the interpretation of the Article to the EBoA. In the former case, the
EPO President can then ask the EBoA to interpret the Article to determine which interpretation is correct, or what
the correct interpretation is. In the latter case, however, the Board of Appeal can frustrate the attempt by rejecting
the referral request. This is not unusual, as can be seen for example from T‐1673/11 Treatment of Pompe's disease/
GENZYME.2 In any event, the option for a patent applicant is only available if the “incorrect” interpretation is one
which gives a broader than desired scope to an exclusion. An applicant can only appeal a decision unfavorable to her,
thus acceptance of a claim covering excluded subject matter can only be appealed by an opponent.
3 | RULE 28(2) EPC
In its decision of March 25 2015, G‐2/12, the EBoA stated:
1. The exclusion of essentially biological processes for the production of plants in Article 53(b) EPC does
not have a negative effect on the allowability of a product claim directed to plants…
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2. … the fact that the only method available at the filing date for generating the claimed subject‐matter is
an essentially biological process for the production of plants disclosed in the patent application does not
render a claim directed to plants … other than a plant variety unallowable.
3. … it is of no relevance that the protection conferred by the product claim encompasses the generation of
the claimed product by means of an essentially biological process for the production of plants excluded
as such under Article 53(b) EPC.
As mentioned above, this caused consternation in the European Parliament, which passed a Resolution calling
on the European Commission to declare that this interpretation was contrary to the intention of Biotech Directive.
The Rules of the EPC had been amended in 1999 to declare that the Biotech Directive should be taken into account
when the Articles of the EPC were interpreted. Specifically, Rule 26(1) EPC states:
For European patent applications and patents concerning biotechnological inventions, the relevant provi-
sions of the Convention shall be applied and interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter
[of the Rules]. Directive 98/44/EC … shall be used as a supplementary means of interpretation.
For the purposes of this paper, the relevant provisions of the Biotech Directive are Art. 4(1), Art. 2(2), Art. 2(3),
and Art. 4(2) EBD. Art. 4(1) EBD states:
The following shall not be patentable:
(a) plant and animal varieties;
(b) essentially biological processes for the production of plants and animals (emphasis added).
The two exclusions are worded as in Art. 53(b) EPC; however, particularly narrow meanings are ascribed to
them in Art. 2 EBD:
(2) A process for the production of plants and animals is essentially biological if it consists entirely of natural
phenomena such as crossing and selection;
(3) The concept of “plant variety” is defined by Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No. 2100/94 (emphasis added).
Also of concern is Art. 4(2) EBD:
Inventions which concern plants or animals shall be patentable if the technical feasibility of the invention
is not constrained to a particular plant or animal variety (emphasis added).
Here, a first question arises as to whether Art. 4(2) EBD overrides the exclusions of Art. 4(1) EBD. Thus, if an
essentially biological process is technically feasible for more than just one variety, is it patentable? Secondly, what is
meant by “which concern”? Does this mean that the claims must be directed to (i.e., have as their directly defined
subject matter) plants or animals, or is it sufficient that the claimed subject matter has some interaction with plants
or animals?
Moreover, just like Art. 53(b) EPC, the Biotech Directive does not specify explicitly that the products of
essentially biological processes are unpatentable; however, in 2016 the European Commission duly issued a Notice
arguing that this should be the correct interpretation. The Commission did concede that the power to interpret the
Directive lay not with itself or the European Parliament but with the Court of Justice of the European Un-
ion (CJEU).
Nonetheless, in view of the Notice, the EPO's Administrative Council decided in June 2017 to amend the EPC
to introduce Rule 28(2) EPC which states:
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Under Article 53(b), European patents shall not be granted in respect of plants or animals exclusively
obtained by means of an essentially biological process.
The Administrative Council has the power to introduce such a Rule under Art. 33(1)(c) and 35(2) EPC. How-
ever, under Art. 164(2) EPC, such a Rule is ineffective if it contradicts Art. 53(b) EPC, that is, expands or restricts
the scope of the Article's exclusion.
Following Rule 28(2) EPC, a patent application of Syngenta was rejected in March 2018. Syngenta appealed,
and in December 2018 the TBoA decided in T‐1063/18 that Rule 28(2) EPC was invalid as it conflicted with Art.
53(b) EPC as interpreted by the Enlarged Board of Appeal in G‐2/12:
Having established that Rule 28(2) EPC is in conflict with Article 53(b) EPC as interpreted by the EBA and
in view of Article 164(2) EPC, it must be concluded that the provisions of the Convention prevail.
Frustrated by decision T‐1063/18, the EPO's Administrative Council agreed that the President of the EPO
should refer the matter to the EBoA. The President is entitled to refer questions to the Enlarged Board under Art.
112(1)(b) EPC on points of law on which two Boards of Appeal have given different decisions.
4 | THE PRESIDENT'S REFERRAL
On April 4 2019 the EPO President, António Campinos, referred two questions (Campinos, 2019) to the EBoA.
Rather than coming straight out and ask whether Rule 28(2) EPC was in conflict with Art. 53(b) EPC, the President
had first to find a contradiction between the decisions of two Boards of Appeal. The contradiction chosen was the
manner in which a Board of Appeal should decide whether or not a Rule contradicts an Article of the EPC: must the
Board consider the meaning of the Article simpliciter or must it consider the meaning of the Article as determined by
the Boards of Appeal/EBoA? The primary cases chosen as displaying this contradiction were T‐315/03 Transgenic
animals/HARVARD representing the first approach, and T‐1063/18 representing the second (supported by T‐39/93
Polymer powders/ALLIED COLLOIDS).
Thus, for example, T‐315/03 from July 2004, states:
The respondent appears to have argued that the law in question is not simply Article 53(a) EPC but
that Article as interpreted in T 19/90. Not only is this a legal impossibility—one cannot combine a
legislative provision with case law interpretation to construct an artificial vires by which to judge an action
or rule as ultra vires—but even if possible it would make no difference since that notional “law” would still
contain nothing to preclude or limit subsequent interpretation (emphasis added).
In contrast, T‐39/93 Polymer powders/ALLIED COLLOIDS from February 1996 had stated that:
the meaning of an Article of the EPC (here, Article 114), on its true interpretation as established by a
ruling of the Enlarged Board of Appeal cannot, in the Board's view, be overturned by a newly drafted Rule
of the Implementing Regulations, the effect of which is to conflict with this interpretation (emphasis added).
T‐1063/18 had followed this reasoning:
An interpretation of the EPC by the EBA is thus to be applied to all cases pending before the departments of
the European Patent Office and before the Boards of Appeal and in all subsequent cases, unless the EBA
provides transitional provisions.
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Having used this perceived divergence in the decisions of the Boards of Appeal to justify his first question, the
President pressed on in his second question to ask whether Rule 28(2) EPC was valid.
5 | THE AMICI
The EBoA invited comments and 41 amicus briefs were received, some in favor of the President's position, some
against. An inordinate amount of effort went into arguing that the President's referral was inadmissible, meaning
that many parties (especially in the agrochemical industry and the patent attorney profession) were deeply con-
cerned that the EBoA might limit the scope of patentability by giving a broader interpretation to the exclusions of
Art. 53(b) EPC.
The President and many amici focused heavily on the meaning of the Biotech Directive. This is hugely pro-
blematical, for several reasons. First, the terms of the Directive have not been incorporated into the Articles of the
EPC. Second, the EPC is not a EU instrument and the EPC contracting states which are not EU member states are
therefore not bound by the terms of the Biotech Directive. As a result, the Boards of Appeal are not bound to apply
the terms of the Directive. Third, the Directive does not explicitly contain a passage corresponding to Rule 28(2)
EPC and the true meaning of the relevant terms of the Directive can only be established by the CJEU, something
the CJEU has not done. Fourth, in some cases the terms of the Directive are in conflict with the meaning of the
Articles of the EPC. Accordingly, the Directive can only be used by the Boards of Appeal as a nonbinding means of
assistance in their task of determining the true meaning of Art. 53 EPC in accordance with the Vienna Convention
on the law of treaties (VCLT) which requires that a “treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.” Art.
31 VCLT allows subsequent agreements and practices to be taken into account, and, if the meaning is still am-
biguous or obscure or leads to an absurd or unreasonable result, Art. 32 VCLT allows reference to the preparatory
work for the treaty, the travaux préparatoires.
Before turning to the President's questions, we will first comment very briefly on the amici. The amici fall into
two sets, one supporting Rule 28(2) EPC and a second considering the Rule to be invalid and the President's referral
to be inadmissible. The first set can be split into four: (a) governmental level amici; (b) associations of plant breeders;
(c) activists and lay‐persons; and (d) a handful of European patent attorneys and academics. The second set can be
split into three: (e) industry associations; (f) patent practitioner associations; and (g) a handful of academics and
European patent attorneys.
A comment by one amicus should be noted before we proceed. Prof. Fritz Dolder (Dolder, 2019) argued that
Dr Ingo Beckedorf should not be the Rapporteur for G‐3/19 in view of his presence on the EBoA in G‐2/12 and
G‐2/13. Indeed, he was the Rapporteur for these cases and thus a very active participant in their outcome.
6 | THE PRESIDENT'S FIRST QUESTION
As mentioned above, for the referral to be admissible, the President had to cite two conflicting Board of Appeal
decisions on the point. For the first question, whether or not the Boards were bound by earlier Board's inter-
pretations, he did this. Needless to say, the second set of amici referred to in Section 5 above were adamant that
the President's first question was not admissible.
The EBoA has had a mixed approach to referrals by the President, in some cases stating that the President's
ability to refer should not be restricted, in others arguing that referrals cannot be of abstract points of law and so
are limited to situations where clarification is required for the EPO to go about its normal business of granting
patents (see G‐3/08 Computer programs). While the Administrative Council precipitated the barrier to going about
normal business by introducing Rule 28(2) EPC, it is entitled to introduce new Rules and, given the Boards' past
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history of (occasionally) misinterpreting the Articles of the EPC, it is difficult to see that the President's first
question related to an entirely abstract point of law.
Nonetheless, the EBOA did indeed consider this to be the case, arguing that the first question was “drafted in
somewhat general terms and is directed to the abstract legal concept of the relationship between the EPC and its
Implementing Regulations.” They continued, stating that the second question left “no doubt as to the real purpose
of the” referral … to request the Enlarged Board to review and, in the end, abandon its interpretation of Article
53(b) EPC in decision G 2/12 …, and to reinterpret the exception to patentability to the effect that Rule 28(2) EPC
gives a conclusive interpretation of the legal scope of that Article.” The EBoA found the wording of the first
question to be “too general and unspecific in that it broaches an institutional topic which reaches well beyond the
ultimate object of the referral.” Accordingly, while accepting the referral to be admissible, the EBoA decided to
reformulate the two questions into one:
Taking into account developments that occurred after a decision by the Enlarged Board of Appeal giving an
interpretation of the scope of the exception to patentability of essentially biological processes for the
production of plants and animals in Article 53(b) EPC, could this exception have a negative effect on the
allowability of product claims or product‐by‐process claims directed to plants, plant material or animals, if
the claimed product is exclusively obtained by means of an essentially biological process or if the claimed
process features define an essentially biological process?
The second question posed by the President had been:
Is the exclusion from patentability of plants and animals exclusively obtained by means of an essentially
biological process pursuant to Rule 28(2) EPC in conformity with Article 53(b) EPC which neither explicitly
excludes nor explicitly allows said subject‐matter?
The reader will note that the EBOA focused the discussion on the process exclusion, rather than allowing the
rest of Art. 53(b) EPC to be taken into account.
This is where the value of the amicus briefs lies. As mentioned above, the EBoA has in the past accepted that
some of its decisions were wrong. G‐3/19 thus gave the EBoA the opportunity to review matters in light of all the
arguments presented, and to decide whether its March 2015 decision in G‐2/12 was in fact correct. In view of the
political, social and legal importance of the point at issue, the patentability of conventionally bred plants and
animals, it was important the EBoA agree to answer the question. Politically, it was important because of the
stances taken by the European Parliament, the European Commission, and many of the national governments of the
EPC contracting states in their amici and their revisions of their national patent laws. Socially, it was of importance
because of the strength of public opinion (as evidenced e.g., by the amici of group (c) referred to in Section 5 above).
Legally, it was of importance since the then current interpretation of Art. 53(b) EPC robbed at least one of the
exclusions from any realistic effect, something that the legislators of the EPC, in particular of the 1973 text, could
not have intended. Thus, we should now turn to the interpretation of Art. 53 EPC.
7 | ARTICLE 53 EPC
The crafting of the wording of the exclusions took decades of careful work and the two sets of exclusions are
presented not just in different Articles of the EPC but in different fashions. Accordingly, the manner in which they
should be interpreted can reasonably be expected to differ, and, in practice this is what has happened. European
Patents are only granted for inventions, and Art. 52(2) EPC declares that certain things, for example, discoveries,
are not inventions, so European Patents cannot be granted for them. However, a narrow interpretation of this
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exclusion is mandated by Art. 52(3) EPC which says that patentability is excluded “only to the extent to which a
European patent application or European patent relates to such subject‐matter as such” (emphasis added). This has
been read to mean that a patent claim which recites something additional, that is, is not limited to reciting as its
subject only an excluded item, can be accepted. Thus, for example a process which involves in part of its application
a mathematical method (excluded) is not itself excluded. The manner in which the exclusions of Art. 52(2) EPC have
been interpreted by the EPO's Boards of Appeal is described in Sterckx and Cockbain (2012, pp. 67–134).
In contrast, Art. 53 EPC relates to subject matter that might be an invention, and hence otherwise patentable
under Art. 52 EPC. The subject matter is excluded for socioethical or political reasons, and thus there is no reason to
consider that the exclusions should be construed narrowly—they are there for a socioethical/political purpose, and one
can reasonably expect that they should be given a construction that achieves that purpose. The Boards of Appeal
have acknowledged this, at least as regards some of the exclusions of Art. 53 (a) and (c) EPC. With the exclusions of
Art. 53(b) EPC, however, the tendency of the Boards of Appeal has been toward a narrow interpretation, one that
finds no basis in the EPC.
Central to the case before the EBoA in G‐3/19 was the fact that Rules of the EPC are invalid under Art. 164(2)
EPC if they force an interpretation of the exclusions of Art. 53 EPC which is either broader or narrower than the
correct interpretation of that Article from its own words or in accordance with the principles of treaty inter-
pretation set forth in the Vienna Convention.
Of relevance here is the statement in G‐2/12 concerning its narrow interpretation of Art. 53(b) EPC:
it might even be inferred from the similarities in the wording of both Article 4(1)(b) Biotech Directive
and Article 53(b) EPC that the exclusion from patenting is to be understood restrictively, to the effect
that claims directed to a product … are not automatically excluded from patenting in the same way
that “essentially biological processes for the production of plants” are. Article 4(2) Biotech Directive
appears to confirm this idea. In the same way as Rule 27(b) EPC, it stipulates that: “inventions which
concerns plants … shall be patentable if the technical feasibility of the invention is not confined to a
particular plant … variety.” Thus the Biotech Directive, to which Rule 26(1) EPC refers as a sup-
plementary means for interpreting the EPC in relation to biotechnological inventions, does not
provide a basis for extending the process exclusion under Article 4(1) Biotech Directive and Article 53(b)
EPC to products of such processes (emphasis added).
Rule 27(b) EPC, it should be noted, dates from 1999, when the EPO's Administrative Council sought to align
the Rules of the EPC with the terms of the Biotech Directive. The EBoA was thus using a Rule to force, or at minimum
support, a narrow interpretation of an Article of the EPC.
8 | THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM, THE “ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM”
The problems with the interpretation of the exclusion of “essentially biological processes” to a huge extent arise
from the manner in which the EBoA chose to interpret the exclusion of “plant or animal varieties” in Art. 53(b) EPC
in its December 1999 decision G‐1/98 Transgenic plants/NOVARTIS II. Why is G‐1/98 so important?
Art. 53(b) EPC says that European patents shall not be granted in respect of plant and animal varieties. G‐1/98
decided that the exclusion only applied to the lowest taxonomic level of plants and animals and that European
Patents could validly contain claims to plants and animals expressed at a higher taxonomic level, even though such
claims would encompass and be infringed by plant and animal “varieties.”
So, the point at issue in G‐3/19 was twofold: (a) does the exclusion of essentially biological processes also
exclude their products (as otherwise the exclusion might be meaningless); or (b) does the exclusion of plant and
animal varieties itself exclude the products of the excluded essentially biological processes? The first point required
COCKBAIN AND STERCKX | 687
an analysis only of the process exclusion, whereas the second required the EBoA to revisit G‐1/98 and determine
whether its “higher taxonomic level” manner of interpreting the exclusion of plants and animals was in fact correct.
This second point is politically explosive in view of the terms of the Biotech Directive which came into effect shortly
before the G‐1/98 decision was handed down and risked upsetting the major players in the agrochemical industry,
something which might explain the desperation shown in the amici opposing the President's referral.
To understand this better, a short deviation to consider the adoption of the Biotech Directive, the background
to G‐1/98, and the EPO's efforts to comply with the terms of the Biotech Directive is needed.
9 | THE BIOTECH DIRECTIVE
Here, the reader must understand that the drive of the European Commission has consistently been to minimize
exclusions from patentability, to optimize the position of commercial operators in the field of biotechnological
innovation. This aim can be detected as a continuous thread throughout the drafting of the Biotech Directive and
can be seen in the Commission's qualifications on the interpretation of the Directive in its Notice when the
European Parliament resolved that the intention of the Directive had been to exclude from patentability the
products of conventional plant‐breeding procedures.
Biotech, and its ability to produce new life forms, exploded in the 1970s and 1980s with the development of
techniques such as recombinant DNA and the Polymerase Chain Reaction and the ability to insert functional exogenous
DNA into bacterial, plant and animal cells. The stance of the US patent authorities changed from considering life forms
not to be patentable to granting patents on them following the US Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty
in 1980. The European Commission worried that the EU would be left behind and started its attempts to have the
European Parliament agree a Directive confirming the patentability of the new techniques and their products.
As a result, a first proposal for the Biotech Directive was put to the European Parliament by the European
Commission in January 1989. On the patentability of plants, animals and essentially biological processes, the
Articles of this proposal said:
Article 3 … plants … shall be considered patentable subject matter…
Article 4 Uses of plant or animal varieties and processes for the production thereof shall be considered
patentable subject matter (emphasis added).
This could hardly be clearer. Art. 53(b) EPC was to be scrapped. This was most explicitly not the intention of the
drafters of the EPC. In June 1992, the European Parliament approved the Proposal, subject to certain amendments,
in particular:
a) Introduction of new Recital 16
Whereas substantial innovations in patent law may be introduced only by means of a revision of the
European Patent Convention.
b) Introduction of new paragraph (b) to Art. 1
This Directive shall not be binding on the Member States as regards the interpretation and im-
plementation of the …European Patent Convention (EP, 1992, emphasis added).
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In effect, the European Parliament was saying that the Directive should not affect the interpretation of the
EPC. That, of course, was not the European Commission's goal and in February 1994 it adopted a revised version in
its Common Position (EC) No. 4/94. The Common Position (EC 1994) did not adopt the amendments set out above.
The back and forth between the European Commission and the European Parliament continued until May 1998
when, with some concessions concerning the morality exclusion which appear in Art. 53(a) EPC, the Parliament
eventually agreed the Directive's provisions relating to plants and animals:
Article 2 (2) A process for the production of plants or animals is essentially biological if it consists
entirely of natural phenomena such as crossing or selection. (3) The concept of 'plant variety` is defined by
Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 2100/94.
Article 4 (2) Inventions which concern plants or animals shall be patentable if the technical feasibility
of the invention is not confined to a particular plant or animal variety (emphasis added).
However, this was not to the taste of all countries, and in October 1988, the Netherlands sought annulment of
the Directive. The Netherlands, joined by Italy and Norway, argued that such changes should instead be made by
renegotiation of the EPC. In its decision in Netherlands v European Parliament in October 2001 the CJEU rejected
the Dutch request.
10 | AFTER THE BIOTECH DIRECTIVE: THE AMENDING OF THE EPC
RULES AND EBoA DECISION G ‐1/98
While initially considering that the EPC was compliant with the Biotech Directive, the EPO did consider introducing
new Rules. Critical to the background of this was a case then pending before the EBoA, G‐1/98 Transgenic plants/
NOVARTIS II.
G‐1/98 resulted from a referral in October 1997 in T‐1054/96 Transgenic plant/NOVARTIS regarding the
interpretation of the exclusion in Art. 53(b) EPC of “plant and animal varieties.” The first three questions re-
ferred were:
1. To what extent should the instances of the EPO examine an application in respect of whether the claims are
allowable in view of the provision of Article 53(b) EPC that patents shall not be granted in respect of plant
varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants, … and how should a claim be in-
terpreted for this purpose?
2. Does a claim which relates to plants but wherein specific plant varieties are not individually claimed ipso facto
avoid the prohibition on patenting in Article 53(b) EPC even though it embraces plant varieties?
3. Should the provisions of Article 64(2) EPC be taken into account when considering what claims are
allowable? (emphasis added).
The referral was made in view of the various interpretations that were possible for the plant and animal variety
exclusion. The TBoA considered the approaches that had been made to the “as such” exclusions of Art. 52(2) EPC
and the different approaches to interpretation of Art 53 EPC in earlier cases. Questions 2 and 3 however focus on
the question as to whether a “novelty” (referred to as substantive) or a “higher taxonomic level” approach should be
adopted (Sterckx & Cockbain, 2012, p. 310). In the “novelty” approach, favored by the referring Board, a claim is not
acceptable if it would be infringed by an excluded product or process; in the “higher taxonomic level” approach, that
of T‐19/90 Onco‐mouse/HARVARD, the claim is acceptable if, although encompassing excluded matter, the relevant
feature is defined at a more generic level than is the exclusion. Thus, for example, a claim to a rodent is acceptable,
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but a claim to Mus mus domesticus is not. This framing of the referral placed the EBoA in the position of choosing
between two unsatisfactory approaches rather than of finding the correct approach.
The EBoA invited the EPO's President to comment on the referral, and in March 1999 he submitted an
extensive comment (Kober, 1999) confirming that he believed that the Directive should be considered when
interpreting Art. 53 EPC, and that the approach that he considered to be correct, the “higher taxonomic level”
approach, was supported by the Directive and should be adopted. In June 1999, the Administrative Council decided
to amend the EPC to introduce new Rules suggesting that the EPC should be interpreted in such a way as to be
compliant with the Biotech Directive. These new Rules, Rules 23a to 23e EPC, came into force in September 1999.
In its decision a couple of months later in December 1999, the EBoA chose the less obviously incorrect approach,
the higher taxonomic level approach, an approach that was apparently in conformity with the Directive and with the
new Rules, and therefore in line with the interests of the Administrative Council and the President. On this basis,
the plant and animal variety exclusion did not exclude plant and animal claims in general, and accordingly the
exclusion of essentially biological processes was deprived of its mechanism for automatically considering the
products of such processes to be excluded. This was the basic underlying reason for the current G‐3/19 referral.
11 | THE TOMATOES I AND BROCCOLI I DECISIONS,
G ‐2/07 AND G ‐1/08
Things might have rested there, with the EPO accepting that the Biotech Directive and the EPC were in conformity.
However, the Directive and the new Rules had given an interpretation to the exclusion of “essentially biological
processes” that offered a window of opportunity to the parts of the agrochemical industry interested in plant
breeding using techniques that involved “technical” steps. Art. 2(2) of the Directive had stated that: “a process for
the production of plants or animals is essentially biological if it consists entirely of natural phenomena such as crossing
or selection” (emphasis added). Clearly, essentially does not necessarily mean entirely.
The British company Plant Bioscience and the State of Israel filed patent applications in 1999 and 2000 for
methods of breeding healthy broccoli and wrinkly tomatoes, EP‐B‐1069819 and EP‐B‐1211926 respectively. The
methods included “technical” steps and the patents were granted in July 2002 and November 2003. The Broccoli
patent was opposed by Syngenta and Limagrain, and the Tomato patent by Unilever. The Opposition Divisions
decided that the subject‐matter was allowable under Art. 53(b) EPC. The opponents appealed, giving rise to cases
T‐83/05 Broccoli/PLANT BIOSCIENCE and T‐1242/06 Tomatoes/STATE OF ISRAEL. In its decisions of May 2007
and April 2008, the TBoA decided to refer questions regarding the Art. 53(b) EPC exclusion to the EBoA (as G‐2/07
Broccoli/PLANT BIOSCIENCE and G‐1/08 Tomatoes/STATE OF ISRAEL, which the EBoA decided to consolidate).
The questions were:
1. Does a nonmicrobiological process for the production of plants which contains the steps of crossing and
selecting plants escape the exclusion of Article 53(b) EPC merely because it contains, as a further step or
as part of any of the steps of crossing and selection, an additional feature of a technical nature?
2. … what are the relevant criteria for distinguishing nonmicrobiological plant production processes ex-
cluded from patent protection under Article 53(b) EPC from nonexcluded ones? In particular, is it
relevant where the essence of the claimed invention lies and/or whether the additional feature of a
technical nature contributes something to the claimed invention beyond a trivial level?
3. Does a nonmicrobiological process for the production of plants consisting of steps of crossing and
selecting plants fall under the exclusion of Article 53(b) EPC only if these steps reflect and correspond to
phenomena which could occur in nature without human intervention?
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4. … does a nonmicrobiological process for the production of plants consisting of steps of crossing and
selecting plants escape the exclusion of Article 53(b) EPC merely because it contains, as part of any of
the steps of crossing and selection, an additional feature of a technical nature?
5. … what are the relevant criteria for distinguishing nonmicrobiological plant production processes ex-
cluded from patent protection under Article 53(b) EPC from nonexcluded ones? In particular, is it
relevant where the essence of the claimed invention lies and/or whether the additional feature of a
technical nature contributes something to the claimed invention beyond a trivial level?
After reviewing the legislative history of the Biotech Directive, the EBoA concluded in Reasons 5:
… the consequence of the self‐contradictory wording of Article 2(2) Biotech Directive having been trans-
posed verbatim into Rule 26(5) EPC is, regrettably, that Rule 26(5) EPC does not give any useful guidance
on how to interpret the term “essentially biological process for the production of plants” in Article 53(b) EPC
and therefore that term must be interpreted on its own authority. This is for the Enlarged Board to do.
Rule 26(5) EPC (introduced as Rule 23b(5) EPC in September 1999 to bring the EPC into compliance with the
Biotech Directive) stated that a process:
is essentially biological if it consists entirely of natural phenomena such as crossing or selection
(emphasis added).
The EBoA then turned to Art. 53(b) EPC itself. First it considered the terms “plant variety” and “plant” used
respectively in the product and process exclusions of Art. 53(b) EPC. Given the relatively recent decision G‐1/98 by the
EBoA under the same Chairman, Peter Messerli, it will come as no surprise that G‐1/98 was followed unquestioningly:
The importance of the difference between the terms “plant” on the one hand and “plant variety” on
the other hand was examined in … G 1/98… In that decision the Enlarged Board held … with
reference to the definition in Article 1(vi) of the UPOV Convention 1991, that “the term (plant)
“variety” means a plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the lowest rank, which grouping…
can be defined by the expression of the characteristics resulting from a given genotype or combi-
nation of genotypes…." More importantly … the difference in wording … “plant” on the one hand and
“plant variety” on the other hand must be supposed to have some meaning. With respect to the term
“plant variety,” the provision would use the more general term “plants” as used for the processes if it
was the intention to exclude plants as a group embracing in general varieties as products. The
converse also holds true when it comes to determining the meaning of the excluded processes for
the production of plants vs. the excluded protection for plant varieties (emphasis added).
It is of course interesting to ponder the logic that a term employed in EPC 1973 and the Strasbourg Patent
Convention (SPC) from 1963 should be interpreted to have a meaning as set down in a law from 1991. It is also well
understood that, while the term “plant variety” may have come to have a well‐defined meaning, Art. 53(b) EPC
refers to “plant or animal varieties” and “animal variety” has no such known definition. Since the term “varieties”
was used for both plants and animals it can be assumed to have the same meaning. Nonetheless, UPOV 1991
provides no immediate basis for a definition of “animal varieties.”
The EBoA accepted the inconsistency of the terminology used by the legislator in the period when the wording
of Art. 53(b) EPC was being settled, 1960–1963, but it stuck with G‐1/98's approach:
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Admittedly, the comments reproduced in … T 83/05 show a certain interchange between the use of the
terms “plant,” “plant species” and “plant variety.” Furthermore, no real explanation can be derived from the
preparatory documents as to why the initial terms “plant variety” or “plant species” were eventually
replaced by the term “plants.”
However, in the absence of any indication in the legislative history that the term “plants” was meant
to signify only “plant varieties,” and in view of the importance of the difference in legal meaning of the
term “plant” on the one hand and “plant variety” on the other, as demonstrated by the Enlarged Board's
decision G 1/98, any interpretation of the term “plant” as meaning, contrary to its wording, only “plant
varieties,” is ruled out.
Hence, the Enlarged Board concludes that the exception of “essentially biological processes for the
production of plants” cannot be read as only applying where the result of such a process is a plant
variety. In other words, it cannot be read as being limited to processes for the production of plant
varieties (emphasis added).
The “importance of the difference in legal meaning” referred to is of course that the meaning settled on for
“plant varieties” allowed G‐1/98 to conclude that European patents could be granted for plants and animals if
claimed at a “higher taxonomic level.” Thus, with negligible effort to interpret the terms “plant” and “plant variety”
beyond accepting the stance of G‐1/98, and with a brief diversion to consider the meaning of the words “for the
production of,” the EBoA turned to the meaning of the words “essentially biological” and threw up its hands in
horror:
Any attempt to determine a reliable literal meaning for the term “essentially biological” process
appears futile. Under the EPC, the legal situation today is that jurisprudence has existed for many
years—for the cases underlying the referring decisions, this is above all decision T 320/87 …—that
has set a standard for the interpretation of the exclusionary clause. Hence, what the Enlarged Board
must now consider is whether the approach as adopted in decision T 320/87 holds good (emphasis added).
Thus, to begin, what was the approach in T‐320/87? There, the Board was faced with a claim to a process for
rapidly developing hybrid plants. In its decision of November 1988, the Board accepted that the “essentially
biological process” exclusion was modeled on Art. 2(b) SPC from 1963 and stated:
Like any exception to a general rule of this kind the exclusion of “essentially biological” processes for the
production of plants (or animals) has to be narrowly construed. …The Board takes the view that whether
or not a (nonmicrobiological) process is to be considered as “essentially biological” within the
meaning of Article 53(b) EPC has to be judged on the basis of the essence of the invention taking into
account the totality of human intervention and its impact on the result achieved. It is the opinion of the
Board that the necessity for human intervention alone is not yet a sufficient criterion for its not being
“essentially biological.” Human interference may only mean that the process is not a “purely biolo-
gical” process, without contributing anything beyond a trivial level (emphasis added).
The “totality of human intervention” approach simply acts as an incentive to the patent applicant to overegg
the importance of any “technical” features. The EBoA decided that this approach was not appropriate and then
turned to the two other approaches mentioned by the referring Board in T‐83/05 (the “contamination” and the
“anything added” approaches referred to by Sterckx & Cockbain, 2012, p, 310). Regarding the first, the EBoA
commented:
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The first approach would be analogous to that used under Article [53(c) EPC] … in relation to methods of
treatment by surgery and therapy and would result in the inclusion in a claimed process of a step of an
essentially biological nature not being allowable. However, it already follows from the wording of the
exclusion, which requires the claimed process, i.e., the process as a whole, to have a biological “essence”
(whatever that may mean precisely), that the mere presence of one biological feature in a process cannot
automatically confer an essentially biological character on the process as a whole.
Regarding the second approach, the EBoA noted that it was analogous to the approach taken to Art. 52(2) EPC
for computer‐implemented inventions and that it would:
require, in order for the process to escape the prohibition of Article 53(b) EPC, at least one clearly
identified “non‐biological” process step, while allowing any number of additional “essentially biological
steps,” which would be carried into allowability by the “non‐biological” process step.
The EBoA considered that the mere presence of a technical feature was not enough since however:
narrowly one might wish to construe the reference to some kind of “essentiality,” any possibility of
interpreting the exclusion in the sense that any technical feature, irrespective of its importance for an
otherwise biological process for the production of plants, makes the process escape the exclusion under
Article 53(b) EPC, is thereby also ruled out from the outset (emphasis added).
The EBoA then decided that it had to look to the purpose of the exclusion:
since the respective legislative purposes behind the sub‐items in Article 53 EPC and even those
behind the alternatives of Article 53(b) EPC are quite different, the systematic context of the
exclusion of essentially biological processes from patentability, namely its place in Article 53(b) EPC,
does not as such indicate what the purpose of the provision is. It only allows the conclusion that
some kinds of processes must be excluded even though they are inventions, and that, hence, the
exclusion may not be interpreted in such a way that it would be entirely deprived of any field of application
and thereby rendered obsolete (emphasis added).
The EBoA decided that it found the purpose of the exclusion in the travaux from 1960 to 1963. The draft of 14
March 1961, prepared with the drafting of UPOV (which contained a ban on dual protection by patents and plant
variety rights) in mind, had an exception from patentability for “inventions relating to the production of or a process
for producing a new plant variety or a new animal species.” By December 1961, this had become “essentially
biological processes for the production of plants and animals.” The EBoA considered that the reasons for this were
of particular importance and referred to T‐83/05 in which they were reproduced verbatim:
According to the explanations given, the (essentially biological) processes for the production of
plants or animals should include those which may produce known varieties as well as those which may
produce new ones. Selection or hybridization of existing varieties are mentioned as examples of such
processes. The replacement of “purely” by “essentially” is explained by the reasoning that it was
evident that the exclusion should be extended to cover processes which were fundamentally of this
type, even if, as a secondary feature, “technical” devices were involved …, it being understood that
while such technical devices may perfectly well be patented themselves the biological process in
which they are used may not (emphasis added).
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It is a pity that the EBoA did not quote further from the Committee report EXP/Brev (61) 8 of 13 De-
cember 1961:
The processes for “the production of plants or animals” referred to in the new text include those
which may produce known varieties as well as those which may produce new ones it being under-
stood that only new varieties can eventually qualify for protection in themselves (CoE, 1961, some
emphasis added).
This seems to be a clear statement that the only protection that new plants could qualify for was plant variety
protection and that the Art. 53(b) EPC exclusion (apart from the microbiological exemption) firmly closed the door on
the patentability of plants however claimed and on biological processes for the production of all plants, whether old
or new. However, quoting this passage would have risked calling the validity of the G‐1/98 decision into question.
Accordingly, in its decisions in December 2010, the EBoA answered the questions referred to it as follows:
1. A nonmicrobiological process for the production of plants which contains or consists of the steps of
sexually crossing the whole genomes of plants and of subsequently selecting plants is in principle
excluded from patentability as being “essentially biological” within the meaning of Article 53(b) EPC.
2. Such a process does not escape the exclusion of Article 53(b) EPC merely because it contains, as a
further step or as part of any of the steps of crossing and selection, a step of a technical nature which
serves to enable or assist the performance of the steps of sexually crossing the whole genomes of plants
or of subsequently selecting plants.
3. If, however, such a process contains within the steps of sexually crossing and selecting an additional step
of a technical nature, which step by itself introduces a trait into the genome or modifies a trait in the
genome of the plant produced, so that the introduction or modification of that trait is not the result of
the mixing of the genes of the plants chosen for sexual crossing, then the process is not excluded from
patentability under Article 53(b) EPC.
4. In the context of examining whether such a process is excluded from patentability as being “essentially
biological” within the meaning of Article 53(b) EPC, it is not relevant whether a step of a technical nature
is a new or known measure, whether it is trivial or a fundamental alteration of a known process, whether
it does or could occur in nature or whether the essence of the invention lies in it.
With the cases remitted to the TBoA, Plant Bioscience and the State of Israel amended their claims to ones
directed to the products of the processes, defined of course at a “higher taxonomic level.” This looked like it might
succeed until opponent Unilever and amicus Sigrid Sterckx submitted letters in October and November 2011
(Sterckx, 2011; Unilever, 2011) arguing that such claims too should be excluded. This led to the TBoA issuing
further decisions in July 2013 and June 2012 referring further questions to the EBoA (as G‐2/13 and G‐2/12, which
the EBoA again decided to consolidate).
12 | THE EBoA's INTERPRETATION OF ART. 53(b) EPC IN G ‐2/12
Before turning to the specifics of this case, we would point out that there has long been controversy as to whether
the EPO Boards of Appeal are truly independent of the EPO administration. The head of the Appeals department,
generally also the Chairman of any EBoA, was also a deputy of the EPO President concerned with the EPO's
administration. Given the tendency for the EPO President to argue for the emasculation of the EPC provisions
limiting patentability, the possible lack of independence of the Boards of Appeal was of concern. This was brought
to a head in a case regarding a petition for review of a TBoA decision in which the EBoA, with a membership
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restricted to exclude the Chairman, decided that he had to be removed from the EBoA. The decision, R‐19/12
Ablehnung wegen Besorgnis der Befangenheit/IXETIC, was handed down in April 2014, that is, before the oral
proceedings and decision in G‐2/12, but the Administrative Council took until June 2016 to decide to change the
structure of the appeals department so that its now head, its President, is an EBoA member, but not the EBoA chair.
The questions put to the EBoA in G‐2/12 and G‐2/13 were:
1. Can the exclusion of essentially biological processes for the production of plants in Article 53(b) EPC
have a negative effect on the allowability of a product claim directed to plants …?
2. In particular, is a claim directed to plants … other than a plant variety allowable even if the only method
available at the filing date for generating the claimed subject‐matter is an essentially biological process
for the production of plants disclosed in the patent application?
3. Is it of relevance … that the protection conferred by the product claim encompasses the generation of
the claimed product by means of an essentially biological process for the production of plants excluded
as such under Article 53(b) EPC?
4. Is a product‐by‐process claim directed to plants … other than a plant variety allowable if its process
features define an essentially biological process for the production of plants?
5. If a claim directed to plants … other than a plant variety is considered not allowable because the plant
product claim encompasses the generation of the claimed product by means of a process excluded from
patentability under Article 53(b) EPC, is it possible to waive the protection for such generation by
“disclaiming” the excluded process?
Here, it must be stressed, the referring Boards of Appeal did not ask the simple question as to whether a claim
to a plant or animal which was the product of an essentially biological process was excluded by Art. 53(b) EPC.
Their focus was entirely on the effect of the process exclusion in Art. 53(b) EPC. This is important since it shows that
the Boards were avoiding challenging the correctness of the sacrosanct decision G‐1/98. As a result, the EBoA
never did reconsider its decision in G‐1/98 and indeed relied on its correctness.
Holding up a fig‐leaf to cover their interpretation, and referring favorably to the Vienna Convention, the EBoA
set out to create the impression that the question of interpretation had been investigated exhaustively. This
required seven rounds of interpretation: grammatical, systematic, teleological, subsequent agreement or practice,
historical, dynamic, and legal erosion. Before commencing, it did accept that the a priori principle that exclusions
from patentability should be construed narrowly had been declared in its earlier decisions G‐1/04 Diagnostic
methods and G‐1/07 Broccoli/PLANT BIOSCIENCE (and indeed in its G‐2/06 Use of embryos/WARF decision) not
to be implicit or binding in the interpretation of the EPC. Thus, we must look to each of the seven interpretative
rounds.
13 | THE APPROACHES TO INTERPRETING THE EXCLUSION
13.1 | The grammatical approach
This approach was to involve determining the literal meaning of the words at issue, followed by investigating
whether the literal interpretation was reasonable and was confirmed by the context in which the words appeared.
Since the key word was “processes,” as it was only the process exclusion that was being interpreted, it will come as
no surprise that the EBoA could not conclude that an instruction to exclude processes was also literally an
instruction to exclude products. However, noting that various amici had argued that the wording did not rule out a
broad reading of the process exclusion as also excluding claims to the products of the excluded processes, the EBoA
decided to move on to the next round of the approaches. Before doing so, it made no suggestion that the exclusion
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as a whole (i.e., of plant and animal varieties and essentially biological processes) needed to be construed instead,
and thus G‐1/98 was not challenged.
13.2 | The systematic approach
The EBoA introduced this approach saying:
In applying this second method of interpretation the meaning of the wording in question is to be
established in the context of the relevant provision itself. In addition, the provision as such must be
interpreted taking into account its position and function within a coherent group of related legal norms
(emphasis added).
Thus, the next stage was to identify a coherent group of related legal norms in which the essentially biological
processes exclusion is located.
The EBoA found that, in G‐1/98, it had given a very narrow and specific scope to the related norm, the
exclusion of plant and animal varieties:
[The exclusion of plant and animal varieties] is restricted to very specific requirements and condi-
tions that need to be fulfilled to justify the verdict “unpatentable.” Even the scope of the exclusion is
limited. In case G 1/98 …, the Enlarged Board concluded that where specific plant varieties are not
claimed individually, the claimed subject‐matter was not excluded from patentability under Article
53(b) EPC, even if it might potentially embrace plant varieties. … Hence, it is rather difficult to derive from
this very specific and narrow exclusion a systematic approach leading to a broad understanding of the
second exclusion, extending its scope from process claims to product claims (emphasis added).
In other words, since we decided on a narrow approach for the plant and animal varieties exclusion, it would
not be systematic to apply a broad approach to the process exclusion. Nonetheless, on its own, the product
exclusion might have been evadable by claiming a process for producing an excluded product, and such claims
would be infringed by their (unpatentable) product. This had to be mentioned:
In this context, it needs to be borne in mind that, if it were not for the process exclusion in Article 53(b)
EPC, patenting of an essentially biological process for the production of plants or animals would mean that
the protection conferred by a process claim extended to the product directly obtained by such process
(Article 64(2) EPC), which could well encompass a plant or animal variety. In consequence … the
process exclusion is inevitable to avoid a contradiction (emphasis added).
This is important because the EBoA here is taking into account the question of whether the excluded can
nonetheless be covered by a patent claim, something it had considered irrelevant in G‐1/98. Moreover, it might be
pointed out that, had this been the intention of the process exclusion (which the travaux clearly show was not the
case), then the process exclusion could simply have related to processes for the production of plant and animal
varieties. This was not done, and this attempt to deduce from a systemic interpretation that the exclusions “as a
coherent group of legal norms” are to be interpreted narrowly is a sham.
The EBoA then broadened up to see if Art. 53 EPC, the socioethical exclusions, represent “a coherent group of
legal norms.” The individual exclusions of the Article were listed, and coherence was waved away by referring to
earlier decisions (which of course may have been incorrect):
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The “system” of exclusions from patentability according to Article 53 EPC is characterised by a
listing of specific inventions for which a European patent is not to be granted. Article 53 EPC … has
been interpreted by the boards of appeal rather restrictively … Thus, Article 53 EPC does not envisage a
system of general exceptions to patentability that per se would allow or even necessitate a broad
interpretation of any of the exclusions (emphasis added).
Of course, relatively broad interpretations have been found to be allowed and necessitated for most of the
exclusions other than that of plant and animal varieties by G‐1/98 (consider, e.g., the therapy, surgery and morality
exclusions).
Broadening even further to consider Art. 52 EPC, the EBoA then added insult to injury before proceeding to
rely on one of the Rules of the EPC introduced in 1999 in response to the Directive (one of the set of Rules which
gave the EBoA cover in G‐1/98 to construe Art. 53(b) EPC narrowly):
Article 52(1) EPC lays down the general principle that European patents are granted for any in-
ventions, in all fields of technology … Therefore, considering the exception to patentability of in-
ventions according to Article 53(b) EPC in its context …, one could deduce two things: first, there is no
clear basis for broadly interpreting Article 53(b) EPC; second, one could rather infer from the systematic
position and function of Article 53(b) EPC that exceptions to patentability are to be narrowly construed. …
Furthermore, Rule 27 EPC … is to be considered in the wider context of Article 53(b) EPC. … Rule
27(b) EPC stipulates that biotechnological inventions relating to plants are patentable if the technical
feasibility of the invention is not confined to a particular plant variety. In addition, Rule 27(c) EPC allows
patenting of a product other than a plant variety obtained by means of a microbiological or other
technical process. … Hence, Rules 27(b) and (c) EPC appear to be guided by a rather wide notion of the
patentability of biotechnological inventions concerning plant‐related processes and products other than
plant varieties (emphasis added).
It was convenient for the EBoA to rely on an argument from authority (the suggestion that the Rules correctly
interpreted Art. 53 EPC), when it could refer to a Rule deriving from the Biotech Directive that supported the
narrow interpretation of the plant and animal varieties exclusion it had jumped at in G‐1/98. Thus, this systematic
approach led the EBoA to conclude that it did “not support giving the process exclusion a broad meaning to the
effect that product claims or product‐by‐process claims are thereby excluded from being patentable.” The EBoA
then turned to the third approach.
13.3 | The teleological approach
Here the name of the approach implies that it is intended to unearth the purpose behind the exclusions of Art. 53(b)
EPC. The EBoA started by confirming this:
the Enlarged Board applies the method of teleological interpretation in the construction of legis-
lative provisions in the light of their purpose, values, and the legal, social and economic goals they aim to
achieve. In this, the Enlarged Board examines their objective sense and purpose … The starting point is
marked by determining the general object of the relevant provision (ratio legis) because the interpretation
must not contradict the provision's spirit … (emphasis added).
The EBoA then proceeded to decide that this had already been done and did not need to be done again:
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In respect of the ratio legis of Article 53(b) EPC, the Enlarged Board in the two previous referrals
concluded (G 2/07 and G 1/08, …): “However, since the respective legislative purposes behind the sub‐
items in Article 53 EPC and even those behind the alternatives of Article 53(b) EPC are quite different, the
systematic context of the exclusion of essentially biological processes from patentability, namely its place in
Article 53(b) EPC, does not as such indicate what the purpose of the provision is.” … This conclusion is still
valid (emphasis added).
This superficial teleological approach led the EBoA to conclude that “the object and purpose of the exclusion
under Article 53(b) EPC is not sufficiently obvious to answer the question whether or not the clause is to be
construed in a narrow or broad way.” Then they turned to the fourth approach.
13.4 | The subsequent agreement or practice approach
This approach of course is based on Art. 31(3) of the Vienna Convention whereby, if (all) the parties to a treaty
reach an agreement or adopt a (binding) practice, the terms of the treaty can be interpreted to comply with that
agreement or practice. This is of particular importance in relation to anything specified by the Biotech Directive
which affects the scope of the provisions of the EPC, since the Directive was adopted by the EU and not by the
noncoextensive set of the contracting states of the EPC.
Nonetheless, not only did the EBoA draw inspiration from the Directive, but it also compounded this by again
referring to Rules of the EPC introduced by the Administrative Council in 1999. It found that Art. 3 EBD did “not
support a broad reading of the exclusion under Article 53(b) EPC” and that the similarity of wording of Art. 4(1)(b)
EBD and Art. 53(b) EPC might infer that “that the exclusion from patenting is to be understood restrictively, to the
effect that claims directed to a product … are not automatically excluded from patenting in the same way that
'essentially biological processes for the production of plants' are.” The EBoA went on to say that:
Article 4(b) Biotech Directive appears to confirm this idea. In the same way as Rule 27(b) EPC, it
stipulates that: “inventions which concerns plants shall be patentable if the technical feasibility of
the invention is not confined to a particular plant variety” [and thus that] … the Biotech Directive, to
which Rule 26(1) EPC refers as a supplementary means for interpreting the EPC in relation to
biotechnological inventions, does not provide a basis for extending the process exclusion under Article
4(1) Biotech Directive and Article 53(b) EPC to products of such processes (emphasis added).
The EBoA then moved on to the next interpretative approach.
13.5 | The historical approach
At last, it was time for the EBoA to turn to the negotiating history, the travaux, of the EPC, more particularly the
1973 text since Art. 53(b) EPC was unchanged in the 2000 revision.
The EBoA chose to begin by saying “we've done this already”:
The Enlarged Board has dealt with the legislative history of Article 53(b) EPC on previous occasions.
… In case G 1/98 … the Enlarged Board … held that the purpose of Article 53(b) EPC corresponds to
the purpose of Article 2(1) UPOV Convention 1961 and Article 2(b) Strasbourg Convention, i.e., that
European patents should not be granted for subject‐matter for which the grant of patents was excluded
under the ban on dual protection in the UPOV Convention 1961 (emphasis added).
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The EBoA read G‐1/98 as concluding that inventions ineligible for protection under the plant breeders' rights
system were intended to be patentable and that the travaux contained no suggestion that Art. 53(b) EPC “could or
even should exclude subject‐matter for which no protection under a plant breeders' rights system was available” (emphasis
added). This had been the EBoA's stance in G‐2/07, in other words the legislator's intention had been to exclude
from patentability the processes which were the “conventional methods of plant‐variety breeding at the time.”
The conclusion that the purpose of the product exclusion was only to avoid dual protection cannot be drawn
since the SPC and the EPC refer to animals as well as plants, since there is no system equivalent to UPOV for
animals, and since “variety” had and has no immediately clear meaning for animals. Thus, it cannot be the case that
the avoidance of dual protection was the entire telos of the exclusions.
The EBoA then turned to the travaux. The first version referred to was to the exclusion of:
“inventions the subject‐matter of which is the breeding of a new plant variety.” This wording actually occurs in a
draft (Haertel, 1961) dated March 3, 1961 by Dr Kurt Haertel, the President of the West German (BRD) Patent
Office, and continued “or a new type of animal.” The text was in German and the German word “Züchtung” can of
course mean growing or cultivating as well as breeding. It is not a committee suggestion and thus cannot be taken
to reflect the view of the relevant committee, here the Patents Working Party, which indeed, in the Comments
dated March 14, 1961 (Document IV/2071/61, Section 14 (EEC, 1961b)) states that it:
concluded that European patents should not be granted for inventions relating to new plant vari-
eties. … [These] comments also apply mutatis mutandis to the patentability of new animal species.
The EBoA found a second version of the exclusion in Document IV/2071/61, Section 13 (EEC, 1961a) reading:
European patents shall not be granted in respect of: … Inventions relating to the production of or a process
for producing a new plant variety or animal species. This provision shall not apply to processes of a technical
nature.
Leaping to the Minutes of the 9th Meeting of Working Party I of October 12–22, 1971 (IGC, 1971), that is,
10 years later, the EBoA noted that:
The UK delegation even requested that the term “essentially biological processes” be deleted because it was
not clear and there was no reason why: “any biological processes other than for the treatment of the human
body should be specifically excluded by the Convention.”
However, this passage in the Minutes continued: “This proposal found no support from any other delegation,”
that is, that the then current exclusion should stay. Having referred to Minutes from 1971, the EBoA returned to
the “subsequent” developments in 1962 and 1965, and 1969:
However, the drafting committee of the Patents Working Party subsequently rephrased the wording
in the form of what later became Article 53(b) EPC (see Preliminary Draft Convention relating to a
European Patent Law, May 1962; travaux préparatoires, Amendments to the Preliminary Draft
Convention relating to a European Patent Law, 22 January 1965). The discussion was predominantly
focused on the issue of “microbiological processes or the products thereof,” the intention being to
bring the exclusion clause into line with Article 2 Strasbourg Convention (travaux préparatoires, minutes
of the meeting of Working Party I, July 8–11, 1969, Article 2(b) Strasbourg Convention) (emphasis
added).
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This passage refers to four documents, in order: 4488/IV/62 (EEC, 1962); 2335/IV/65 (EEC, 1965); BR/7/69
(IGC, 1969); and Art. 2(b) SPC. The Preliminary Draft, 4488/IV/62, proposed the wording:
European patents shall not be granted in respect of … plant or animal varieties or essentially biological
processes for the production of plants or animals
This is identical to the wording of Art. 53(b) EPC adopted in 1973, except for the absence of the microbiological
exemption. 2335/IV/65, from January 1965, and based on intervening work not cited by the EBoA, amended this
wording to add the microbiological exemption in the words used in Art. 2 SPC, that is, almost the present form of
Art. 53(b) EPC. Thus, we must turn to the third document, BR/7/69, the Minutes of a meeting in July 1969.
Interestingly, the only relevant passage, is the statement on page 10, that the exclusion “corresponds to Article 2 of
the 1963 Strasbourg Convention.” The documents cited do not leave us with any grounds to believe that
the intention of the framers of Art. 53(b) EPC had changed since May 1962, other than to acknowledge that some
might have worried that an exclusion of microbiological processes, for example, fermentation, might in future be
read into the plant and animal exclusions. The EBoA did not establish the intention of the framers in relation to the
plant and animal exclusions themselves. A deeper reading would have been required.
Nonetheless, the EBoA concluded its “historical approach” by stating that:
The legislative history of Article 53(b) EPC in respect of the legal term in question is rather vague. The
discussion in the Working Party never concerned the question of whether or not the wording
“essentially biological process for the production of plants” included a product that is defined or
obtained by such a method for its production. Thus, in the context of the historic discussion … there is
no reason in the travaux préparatoires to assume that a product that is characterised by the method of
its manufacture but claims protection regardless of that (or any other) method was meant to be
excluded (emphasis added).
The five standard approaches to interpretation had given the EBoA no reason to exclude plants and animals
other than varieties as defined by UPOV from patentability and so, following an issue raised by various amici, it
turned to the two extra approaches, dynamic and legal erosion, to test the conclusions it had reached.
13.6 | The dynamic approach
In G‐1/98, the EBoA had referred to a further approach, a “dynamic interpretation” which might come into play
where factors have arisen since the EPC was signed which might give reason to believe that a literal interpretation
would conflict with the legislator's aims. The EBoA noted that Art. 53(b) EPC had remained unamended since the
drafting of the 1973 text, even though the science relating to plant and animal breeding had advanced enormously.
However, while the Article showed “the legislator's clear intention to exclude from patenting essentially biological
processes of the kind known at the time of the signing of the EPC,” the “subsequent developments in the field of
plant breeding techniques did not prompt the legislator to revise the process exclusion such that it was extended to
plant products obtained by essentially biological processes” (emphasis added). This can only be construed as
meaning that the contracting states saw no reason to call a diplomatic conference to revise Art. 53(b) EPC and that
they saw no reason to include a revision of Art. 53(b) EPC in the diplomatic conference of November 2000.
First, one might comment that perhaps no reason was seen because the legislator was under the impression
that the products of essentially biological processes were already excluded by the Article. That this was the case
seems clear from the explanation given to the Dutch government when the ratification of EPC 1973 was being
decided in the mid 1970s:
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no patents can be obtained for plant and animal varieties or for essentially biological processes for
the production of plants and animals; in fact, the products of these processes will accordingly also not be
patentable (Staten‐Generaal, 1976, p. 18, our translation from Dutch, emphasis added).
Secondly, the 2000 diplomatic conference was arranged following the adoption of the Biotech Directive and
under the aegis of a President of the EPO who strongly favored limiting the EPC's exclusions from patentability
(see Sterckx & Cockbain, 2012, pp. 56–66). The major proposed revisions were set out by the President in June
2000 in CA/PL 25/00 (EPO, 2000a), and the draft text, MR/3/00 (EPO, 2000b), for the revised EPC was produced
in October 2000 by the Administrative Council of the EPO, the same body that had pushed through Rule changes in
1999, the same Rules that had facilitated the EBoA's decision in G‐1/98 in December 1999. There can be little
surprise that there was no push toward clarifying the exclusions in any way that conflicted with the Directive.
Accordingly, the EBoA concluded that:
This decision of the legislator not to amend Article 53(b) EPC can neither be ignored when interpreting
Article 53(b) EPC, nor be reversed by means of a dynamic interpretation. The Enlarged Board cannot see
why the legislator's original intention to direct the exclusion from patentability in respect of plants to only
two groups, i.e., “plant varieties” and “essentially biological processes for the production of plants,” would no
longer be justified, just because today there are new techniques available in this sector. Thus, the concept of
a dynamic interpretation does not require revising the result of the interpretation established by applying
traditional rules of construction.
This left only “legal erosion.”
13.7 | Legal erosion
There has been much written about patent attorneys' use of crafty language when drafting claims to avoid rejection
on the basis of statute and case law. This, after all, is part of the reason for employing a patent attorney. The TBoA
which referred the G‐2/12 and G‐2/13 cases had mentioned this skillful drafting, as the EBoA put it, raising:
the question whether allowing patenting of a product claim or a product‐by‐process claim for a plant or
plant material other than a plant variety that is obtained by means of an essentially biological process could
be qualified as circumvention of the process exclusion. Thus, it was said, the legislator's intentions could be
frustrated by the choice of the claim category and by “skilful” claim drafting.
The EBoA noted that:
it could be contended that the legislator's intention to exclude from patentability method claims for an
essentially biological process for the production of plants would be frustrated if an applicant or patent
proprietor … succeeded in acquiring patent protection for a product which was directly and inevitably
obtained by said process. … This argument might apply particularly if the product was explicitly determined
by the process, making the method features a required part of the claim defining the extent of protection
conferred by the patent
The EBoA had even commented on this in G‐2/06 Use of embryos/WARF, stating that: “to restrict the ap-
plication of Rule 28(c) … EPC to what an applicant chooses explicitly to put in his claim would have the undesirable
COCKBAIN AND STERCKX | 701
consequence of making avoidance of the patenting prohibition merely a matter of clever and skilful drafting of such
claim.”
The EBoA acknowledged that the cases before it had involved various different claim formats, initially method
and product claims, but by this stage only product and product‐by‐process claims. It considered, however, that:
to describe these amendments and the patent proprietors' procedural behaviour as an evasion of the
exception to patentability of “essentially biological processes for the production of plants” rendering
Article 53(b) EPC meaningless, or without any substance in its scope of application, would be to
assume that the legislator intended—or envisaged—a broadening of the term “process” as a matter of
jurisprudence” (emphasis added).
Given the EBoA's interpretation of the exclusion under the approaches so far considered, that assumption
would have to be tested against certain “considerations of fact as well as of law.” The argument on facts was that to
determine whether a product infringed, one would have to know whether it had been produced by the excluded
process. This is ridiculous since it is an everyday problem with granted claims to processes to determine whether a
particular product infringes by virtue of being the direct product of the claimed process. For patent application
examination purposes, it can be dealt with by including an exclusion in the product claim “other than a product
produced directly by an essentially biological process.”
On the “legal issue,” the referring TBoA had raised the question whether it was of relevance that the protection
conferred by the product claim encompasses the generation of the claimed product by means of an essentially
biological process for the production of plants excluded as such under Article 53(b) EPC. The EBoA, however,
considered that the question of law put to it by the TBoA was only whether a product claim is excluded by virtue of
the excluded nature of the process for making it, and that the scope of protection conferred by the product claim
has no direct impact on this point of law. The EBoA considered that a distinction has to be made between the
questions of what can be patented and the scope of the resulting claims—in other words, there is no problem
granting claims whose subject matter, according to their precise wording, is not excluded, even if the performance
of an action or the production or use of a product, which action or product are unpatentable, would infringe those
claims. This is essentially the head‐in‐the‐sand attitude of G‐1/98, and, indeed, G‐1/98 was used to support this
conclusion.
The EBoA then confirmed its awareness of the various ethical, social and economic aspects in the general
debate, documented in for example: European Parliament resolutions; reports of national parliamentary commit-
tees; reports of national governments to national parliaments; draft resolutions of national parliaments; ex-
planatory notes by national governments; changes in national laws; and in the amici submitted during the case.
Considering such general arguments, however, was considered not to “fall under the judicial decision‐making
powers of the Enlarged Board.” After all, it “has to be borne in mind that the role of the Enlarged Board of Appeal is
to interpret the EPC using generally accepted principles of interpretation of international treaties. It is not man-
dated to engage in legislative policy.”
Alternatively put, if regional or national governments or parliaments disagree with the EBoA, they should
convene a diplomatic conference and amend the EPC. The EBoA considered that the District Court of The Hague in
Netherlands had followed similar reasoning to reach the same conclusion. The case in question was the “Purple
radish” case Cresco v Taste of Nature of May 2013. The Dutch Court found that product claims were not excluded by
the process exclusion of Art. 53(b) EPC and declined to consider the fact that they might be excluded by the
product exclusion:
In the appeal, Cresco has for the first time argued … that claim 4 of the patent relates to a plant variety and
thus is … excluded from patentability on the basis of the first part of Art. 53(b) EPC. The introduction of
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such a new ground for invalidity during appeal seems to the Court to be in conflict with good procedure.
Accordingly, this plea will be put aside (our translation from Dutch).
Thus, the EBoA concluded “the choice of one or the other claim category is not a matter of some sort of “skillful
claim drafting” or circumvention of legal hurdles but of the prerequisites for … patentability.”
The EBoA did not address the question as to whether the EPO's own Boards of Appeal might themselves have
been guilty of “legal erosion” of the exclusions from patentability set out in the EPC. That they have done so, and
have realized that they have done so, is evident, for example, from G‐2/08 Dosage regime/ABBOTT RESPIRATORY
when it removed approval from the so‐called Swiss‐type second medical indication claims that it had approved in its
first decision G‐5/83 Second medical indication/EISAI.
Having found that exhaustive interpretation using all the different approaches had not changed its position, the
EBoA gave its answers to the questions the TBoA had posed.
14 | THE EBoA'S ANSWERS IN G‐2/12 AND G‐2/13
In its decisions in March 2015, the EBoA answered the questions as follows:
1. The exclusion of essentially biological processes for the production of plants in Article 53(b) EPC does
not have a negative effect on the allowability of a product claim directed to plants…
2. … the fact that the only method available at the filing date for generating the claimed subject‐matter is
an essentially biological process for the production of plants disclosed in the patent application does not
render a claim directed to plants or plant material other than a plant variety unallowable.
3. … it is of no relevance that the protection conferred by the product claim encompasses the generation of
the claimed product by means of an essentially biological process for the production of plants excluded
as such under Article 53(b) EPC.
It was these answers that precipitated the European Parliament Resolution (EP, 2015) of December 2015 and
the European Commission Notice (EC, 2016) of November 2016, which in turn precipitated the President's referral
of April 4, 2019 which gave rise to G‐3/19. We must now turn back to the arguments by the President and the amici
in G‐3/19 for what the answer to the rewritten question, might or should be.
15 | THE POSSIBLE ANSWER TO THE REVISED QUESTION
In the discussion below, no account will be taken of resolutions or notices that do not represent a binding
agreement taken by all the contracting states of the EPC, and no account will be taken of the wishes or desires of the
amici that they be freed from worrying about patents for plants and animals. The EBoA seems to be correct in
interpreting the Vienna Convention in that fashion. Even the Biotech Directive is not relevant, since it binds only
the EU member states and its incorporation into the Rules of the EPC can have no broadening or narrowing effect
on the correct scope of Art. 53 EPC. So, what does this leave?
The President's referral letter (Campinos, 2019) is decidedly unhelpful. Virtually the only relevant argu-
ment is made in paragraphs 103 and 111 regarding subsequent agreement and practice to be taken into
account in accordance with the Vienna Convention. In paragraph 103, the President states that, since the
European Commission Notice of November 2016, “all 38 Contracting States of the European Patent Con-
vention have indicated and declared that under their national law and practice the products (plants and
animals) of essentially biological processes are excluded from patentability.” However, this does not relate to a
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binding agreement between the contracting states, and, in any event, it does not seem to be correct. Thus, for
example, the Manual of Patent Practice of the UKIPO (in its current form of April 1 2020—UKIPO, 2020) makes
no such statement and refers to the examiners' guidelines Examining patent applications for biotechnological
inventions which (in its current form of October 21, 2016—UKIPO, 2016), in paragraph 104, instead suggests
that G‐2/12 and G‐2/13 should be followed.
We must therefore turn to the comments in the two sets of amici referred to in Section 5 above, that is, first
groups (a) to (d) supporting Rule 28(2) EPC, and second groups (e) to (g) rejecting it.
16 | THE AMICI
We begin with the amici of group (a), namely those of the national or regional governments or departments. The
German amicus (BJV, 2019) reviewed the EBoA's interpretation following approaches discussed above and con-
cluded that these approaches showed that a narrow interpretation of the exclusion of Art. 53(b) EPC was not
required, and that therefore a broad interpretation, as in Rule 28(2) EPC might be correct. The Danish amicus
(MFAD, 2019) pointed out that allowing the patentability of the products of essentially biological processes would
leave the process exclusion void, inherently an interpretation of Art. 53 EPC that would be contrary to the Vienna
Convention requirement to consider the purpose of a treaty term. This point was further elaborated in the
European Commission amicus (EC 2019) which, in paragraph 82 states:
The principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat), following from Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention and generally recognised as a fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation, holds
that an interpretation which renders part of a treaty redundant is to be rejected.
The Dutch amicus (MFA, 2019) referred to the explanatory memorandum (Staten‐Generaal, 1976) for the
Dutch law of 1975 approving accession to the EPC. This memorandum illustrates the understanding of the legislators
of EPC 1973, shortly after the finalization of the EPC, that the products of essentially biological processes were
excluded from patentability by Art. 53(b) EPC.
Turning now to the group (b) amici, those of Euroseeds and Bundesverband Deutscher Pflanzenzüchter also
raised the point made by the Danish and European Commission amici that it could not have been the intention of
the EPC legislator to adopt a provision without practical effect. The Plantum amicus (Plantum, 2019), like the Dutch
amicus, drew attention to the explanatory memorandum (Staten‐Generaal, 1976), and added a reference to a paper
by the Oxford University intellectual property law lecturer Justine Pila (Pila, 2009) regarding the travaux relating to
Art. 53(b) EPC. Plantum argued that, in her paper, Pila suggested that the difference in the terms “plants or animals”
and “plant or animal varieties” was not understood as having a substantive effect, thereby supporting the reasoning
that there was no perceived need to exclude the products of the excluded processes, since they were already
excluded.
From group (c) of the amici, No patents on seeds! echoed the concerns of the European Commission and Danish
amici, pointing out that the interpretation of the process exclusion must take into account the product exclusion in
the first part of the sentence. The petition and the multiple organization amici did little more than show the
widespread concern within the public about the EPO's erosion of the EPC's exclusions from patentability.
From group (d) of the amici, Dolder (2019) again argued that a treaty term should not be interpreted in such a
manner as to have no useful effect, and drew attention to the interpretation approach adopted by the EBoA in G‐2/
06 Use of embryos/WARF, where attention was given not just to the wording of the particular claims at issue but to
the “whole content” of the patent or patent application. In this way, the problem of “mere skillful drafting of claims”
could be avoided. This could be seen to some extent as a criticism of the EBoA's decision G‐1/98, which was the
focus of the amicus of Julian Cockbain (Cockbain, 2019) which drew attention to the travaux of the EPC and the
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erosions to the exclusions from patentability that had resulted from the Board of Appeal decisions. Cockbain's
argument was that Art. 53(b) EPC provided a comprehensive exclusion of claims to plants and animals and only
allowed the claiming of essentially technological processes for producing them, according to which only the plants
and animals obtained as the direct product of the technological process would benefit from patent protection, and
not any plants or animals produced by subsequent biological processes, such as mating, crossing, and so forth.
Also falling in group (d) was the amicus of Metzger et al. (2019) of the law faculty of the Humboldt University of
Berlin. Metzger et al. argued that Rule 28(2) EPC should be seen as a valid interpretation of Art. 53(b) EPC, but that
a reinterpretation of the term “essentially biological processes” was required to avoid exclusion of processes having
a novel and inventive technical component. They argued that the exclusion of Art. 53(b) EPC could be seen to have
an overarching purpose, that of requiring technicality rather than that of excluding a field, namely breeding. To the
extent that their amicus suggested that Art. 53(b) EPC could be interpreted as having an overarching purpose, it
added to the suggestions of the other amici.
In groups (e) and (f) were the amici of the agrochemical industry groups and of six of the national, regional and
international associations of the professionals in the field of intellectual property law. These added nothing of
relevance here except the one from the UK association CIPA (CIPA, 2019), which argued that the only reason for
departing from the EBoA's decisions G‐2/12 and G‐2/13 would be if there had been very clear flaws in the EBoA's
reasoning.
Of the final group of amici in the second set, group (g), only two (Malek, 2019; Steenbeek, 2019) are relevant
here. Leo Steenbeek and Olaf Malek argued that Rule 28(2) EPC is contrary to the grammatical interpretation of
Art. 53(b) EPC since it adds a fourth and further exclusion to the three exclusions already listed. If the Rule, under
the correct interpretation of Art. 53(b) EPC, did add a further exclusion, then Steenbeek and Malek would have been
correct.
17 | HOW COULD THE QUESTION HAVE BEEN ANSWERED?
The question put to the EBoA was essentially: Does Art. 53(b) EPC permit European patents to be granted for
plants or animals which are the direct product of essentially biological processes for the production of plants or
animals?
If the word “variety” has a meaning narrower than “any type of,” the literal answer to the question is that there
are two sets of direct products of such processes, things that are varieties, and things that are not varieties. The
first set is excluded by the first part of the Art. 53(b) EPC exclusion, while the second is not. This raises the
question: what is meant by a “variety”? For plants, some would argue that the term has come to have a meaning,
essentially that set out in Art. 1(vi) UPOV 1991:
“variety” means a plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the lowest known rank, which
grouping … can be
1. defined by the expression of the characteristics resulting from a given genotype or combination of
genotypes,
2. distinguished from any other plant grouping by the expression of at least one of the said character-
istics and
3. considered as a unit with regard to its suitability for being propagated unchanged
Thus, a plant variety is a plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the lowest known rank which can be
defined by a distinguishing phenotype resulting from a genotype and which can propagate unchanged. This is sup-
ported by the definition in Council Regulation (EC) No. 2100/94 of “protectable varieties”:
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Article 6 Protectable varieties: Community plant variety rights shall be granted for varieties that are:
(a) distinct; (b) uniform; (c) stable; and (d) new. …
Article 7 Distinctness: … A variety shall be deemed to be distinct if it is clearly distinguishable by
reference to the expression of the characteristics that results from a particular genotype or combination of
genotypes, from any other variety …
Article 8 Uniformity: A variety shall be deemed to be uniform if, subject to the variation that may be
expected from the particular features of its propagation, it is sufficiently uniform in the expression of
those characteristics which are included in the examination for distinctness, as well as any others used for
the variety description.
Article 9 Stability: A variety shall be deemed to be stable if the expression of the characteristics which
are included in the examination for distinctness as well as any others used for the variety description,
remain unchanged after repeated propagation or, in the case of a particular cycle of propagation, at the end
of each such cycle (emphasis added).
Applied to both plants and animals, this means that a “variety” is a grouping within a single taxon of the lowest
known rank which can be defined by a distinguishing phenotype resulting from a genotype and which can propagate
unchanged.
In other words, a plant or animal is not a “variety” if it is not distinguishable by reference to the “novel”
characteristics that result from its modified genotype, and if those characteristics do not remain unchanged on
propagation. Thus, a mouse modified to produce a particular human protein is not a variety if, when mated with
another such mouse, the progeny do not produce that protein. But if the progeny do produce that protein, it is a
variety. A mouse characterized by having had its tail cut off, is not a variety. Likewise, a mouse characterized by
having enhanced resistance to disease as a result of having been vaccinated is not a variety.
Returning to the question, it appears that there are two forms of possible plant or animal, those which
propagate retaining the phenotype characteristic of a particular genotype (varieties), and those that do not
(nonvarieties). The first are not patentable whilst the second are. Does this give a coherent picture to the exclusions
of Art. 53(b) EPC? Before answering this, we must look to what could be patentable in respect of a product. Here
the answer is three things: the product itself; a process for producing it; and a process using it.
What would our interpretation yield for plants (or animals). A plant variety is not patentable, but a nonvariety
is patentable. A process for producing any plant is not patentable if it is “essentially biological,” but patentable if it is
not. Thus, a technical process for producing a plant or animal is patentable, whether or not the product is a variety,
and that results in the direct product of the technical process being covered by the process claims, but not the
progeny of such products. A process using a plant is patentable as long as it is not itself an essentially biological
process for producing a(nother) plant. Accordingly, technical processes are patentable, their direct products can be
covered by claims to the technical process, nonvarieties are patentable, and technical and nontechnical processes
(other than the excluded processes) using plants are patentable.
How does our interpretation fit with the apparent intentions of the legislator of EPC 1973? First, there is no
overlap between patents and plant variety protection. Second, the performance of technical processes and their
direct products are patentable.
In the 1955 Gajac Report (CoE, 1955), an early milestone in the travaux, reference was made to methods of treating
seeds—these would be patentable both as processes and products (since the treatment would not be heritable). In
travaux document EXP/Brev (56) 8 (COE, 1956), reference was made to action exercised on the development of plants
and animals and the utilization of natural products such as flowers, fruits, seeds, and so forth—these processes would be
patentable. Document IV/2071/61‐E (EEC, 1961b) referred to European patents as having to be granted for “processes
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which, while being applicable to plants, are of a technical nature, for example, processes for producing new plants by
irradiation of the plants themselves or the seed with isotopes”—these processes would be patentable.
Thus, the interpretation we propose does seem to be both coherent and in line with the discussions in the
travaux. But how would it apply in practice? This seems simple. A claim to a plant or animal characterized by feature X
would be unpatentable if feature X was heritable. A claim to a process for producing a plant or animal with
characteristic X would be unpatentable if the step involving introduction of feature X is followed by an essentially
biological process step (propagation) or is in an essentially biological process step. A claim at a higher taxonomic level,
for example, to rodents having feature X, would then be unpatentable if the feature was heritable, but otherwise it
would be patentable. As made clear above, the EBoA has swapped back and forth between arguing that a claim
cannot be valid if it encompasses excluded matter and arguing that it can be valid if defined at a “higher taxonomic
level.” This is abundantly clear since Art. 53(b) EPC has to be interpreted in light of the time of its adoption in 1973
and, at that time, Art. 1 UPOV 1961 forbade protection of any variety by both patents and plant variety rights. Thus,
no valid claim of a European Patent to “plants with feature X” could encompass varieties with feature X.
How does our proposed interpretation compare with the desire in the Biotech Directive to give broad patent
protection to novel technical processes? In its recitals, the Biotech Directive states:
(2) Whereas, in particular in the field of genetic engineering, research and development require a
considerable amount of high‐risk investment and therefore only adequate legal protection can make
them profitable;
(31) Whereas a plant grouping which is characterised by a particular gene (and not its whole
genome) is not covered by the protection of new varieties and is therefore not excluded from
patentability even if it comprises new varieties of plants;
(32) Whereas, however, if an invention consists only in genetically modifying a particular plant
variety, and if a new plant variety is bred, it will still be excluded from patentability even if the
genetic modification is the result not of an essentially biological process but of a biotechnological
process
Regarding Recital 2, the interpretation proposed guarantees legal protection for the technical processes and
the direct products thereof in the field of genetic engineering. Regarding Recital 31, our interpretation guarantees
protection for those parts of a generic claim that are not themselves excluded plant varieties. Regarding Recital 32,
our interpretation is fully in line with this.
Finally, we must turn to the second part of Art. 53(b) EPC, the microbiological exemption, to see if this fits with
our interpretation of the first part of the Article:
this provision shall not apply to microbiological processes or the products thereof.
The provision could only apply if the microbiological processes in question are otherwise viewable as
“essentially biological processes for the production of plant or animals” as otherwise it is unnecessary. In effect it
covers the event where a microbiological process could be viewed as being a biological process. Thus, in effect,
processes are deemed technical rather than biological if they are microbiological. However, zygote formation by
combination of gametes clearly could not be seen as “microbiological” in this context. What seems to be intended is
production of a plant (or animal) having feature X by extraneous introduction of something giving rise to that
feature, for example, perhaps by gene modification to give the treated plant or animal some (nonheritable) trait.
The process, being microbiological, is not excluded, and the product, a nonvariety, is also not excluded.
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Alternatively, if the concern was that microbes might incorrectly have been considered to be plants or animals, the
effect of the exemption is merely to confirm that they are not.
In the context of 21st century biotechnology, genetic manipulation of a plant or animal cell to introduce a new gene
or to modify an existing gene might be considered to be a microbiological process and accordingly the process itself
would be patentable as well as its product, a genetically transformed cell. For a transformed cell to grow into a plant or
animal as such, however, involves a subsequent essentially biological process for the production of a plant or animal, and
that process (and its product) would not be covered by the exemption of microbiological processes and their products.
18 | THE EBoA'S APPROACH IN G‐3/19
Throughout its opinion, the EBoA confirms in G‐3/19 that it stands by the reasoning and conclusions of its five
earlier pronouncements on the interpretation of the exclusions of Art. 53(b) EPC, including the results of all of the
different interpretation techniques applied in G‐2/12. The only basis for changing its interpretation would be the
“dynamic interpretation” technique taking account of developments between its G‐2/12 decision in March 2015
and the adoption of Rule 28(2) EPC in June 2017. The EBoA concluded that the actions of the European Parliament,
the European Commission and the national parliaments of the EPC Member states had no effect. What did have
effect however was the action of the EPO's Administrative Council in adopting Rule 28(2) EPC—did this justify a
dynamic re‐interpretation of Article 53'b) EPC? The EBoA concluded that it did and decided on that basis to
abandon the interpretation it had reached in G‐2/12; the interpretation set out in the new Rule had become the
correct interpretation simply by virtue of the Rule being adopted. G‐2/12's interpretation had been correct, but the
adoption of the Rule made the Rule's interpretation now the correct one.
This is an astounding emasculation of Art. 164 EPC whereby if a Rule conflicts with the correct interpretation
of an article of the EPC, the Article must prevail. As the EBoA put it, as “the content of Rule 28(2) EPC does not
stand in contradiction to the new interpretation of Article 53(b) EPC given in this opinion, there is no conflict
between these provisions.”
Since the interpretation was new to the extent that it contradicted an earlier, then correct, interpretation,
a period of grace had to be granted and the EBOA Decided that the old interpretation was still valid for patents
granted before July 1, 2017 when the new Rule came into effect and for applications with a filing or priority date
before then.
Also of concern is the exact wording of the EBoA's reply to its rewritten question:
The exception to patentability of essentially biological processes for the production of plants or
animals in Article 53(b) EPC has a negative effect on the allowability of product claims and product‐
by‐process claims directed to plants, plant material or animals, if the claimed product is exclusively
obtained by means of an essentially biological process or if the claimed process features define an
essentially biological process (emphasis added).
In its earlier decision regarding compositions of human embryonic stem cells, G‐2/06 Use of embryos/WARF,
the EBOA had decided that such compositions were not patentable if, at the time the patent application was filed,
reproducing the invention would necessitate destroying human embryos. It left a “deposit loophole” whereby, as
long as a culture of human embryonic stem cells had been deposited before the filing date, reproducing the
invention would not involve embryo destruction, since such a culture could be used. In G‐3/19, the EBoA has left a
similar loophole; as long as the applicant explains in her patent application how the gene combination could be
achieved in a technical fashion (e.g., to produce a plant with features X and Y, one could transform a plant with
feature X by CRISPR gene‐editing to introduce the gene for feature Y), then the plant can be patented.
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Our conclusion therefore is that the EBoA has satisfied political pressures while still maintaining its “higher
taxonomic level” approach of G‐1/98. It has left a loophole, and more worryingly, it has opened the door to the
EPO's Administrative Council doing away with other pesky exclusions from patentability that the drafters of EPC
1973 so inconveniently chose to include. G‐3/19 is a bad and dangerous decision.
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